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Abstract
We propose an algorithm for computing main stable sets (recently introduced in [5]) on
e ectiveness form coalitional games modeled through a directed pseudograph. The algorithm
is based upon an extended path graph traversing method, and we study some its interesting
computational aspects for making these stability concepts as useful tools for decision theory.
Keywords: Algorithmic game theory; coalitional games; dominance relations; stable sets;
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1 Preliminaries
Cooperative behaviour often emerges at a group rather than social level. In many instances we
observe the formation of independent and sometime competing groups, teams, clubs, cooperatives
(coalitions for short) each of them persecuting the same goal whose outcome is exogenously
divided between members in the group (in turn provision of commodities, raising of public
funds, standards of behaviour and so on). Each player participating in a move from a coalition
to another is endowed with a coe cient measuring his safety/risk attitude.
Examples of this behaviour are numerous both at micro and macro level: scientiﬁc research
groups, university departments, consumers’ associations, ﬁrms as organizations, consumption and
production cooperatives, industrial districts, international commercial treatises among countries
are all instances of volunteer agreements among independent parties that coalesce to obtain a
same goal. Once coalitions form, society is partitioned in a coalitional structure.
1.1 E ectiveness coalitional games




N,Z,{ i}i N,{ S}S N,S = , 
 
2where
•Nis the set of players; a nonempty subset S  N is called coalition.
•Zis a subset of all the partitions of N whose elements are disjoint coalitions. Any element
of Z is called outcome or coalition structure;
• i is a strong preference relation deﬁned on Z associated to player i;
• S is a reﬂexive relation deﬁned on Z associated to S  N.
•     RN is a vector measuring the safety/risk level of any player.
The family of preference relations   := { i}i N can be replaced by a value function V : Z 
RN whose component Vi(a) denotes the payo  obtained by player i if the coalition structure a
is formed. In addition, the family { S}S N is called e ectiveness relation of  .
The game is played in the following manner: when the game begins, there is a status quo
outcome, say a. If the members of a coalition S decide to change the status quo to an outcome b,
then the status quo becomes b. This means a  S b. From this new status quo b, other coalitions
might move to c ( i.e. b  T c) through T and so forth. If the game reaches an outcome from
which no coalition moves, the game ends and this outcome has to be necessarily considered
stable. Step by step, any player i could prefer an outcome to another one by using his preference
relation  i or his value function Vi. All actions are public. If a  i b for all i   S, we write
a  S b.
We say that a is directly dominated by b, or a<b , if and only if there exists a coalition
S such that a  S b and a  S b. Any game in e ectiveness form can be represented by a
directed pseudograph: any node represents a coalition structure (outcome); any edge represents
an element of e ectiveness relation labelled by a suitable coalition. For instance, a  S b means
that outcome b is reached by outcome a through coalition S’s decision. In addition, a vector in
RN is associated to any node and it represents payo s of any player whatever the coalition he








{2}    c,V(c) c = {{1},{2},{3}} d = {{1,2,3}}
d,V(d)
Figure 1: An example of game in e ectiveness form with 3 players and 4 outcomes.
{{1,2},{3}} means that players 1,2 are in the same coalition while player 3 forms a singleton
coalition.
1.2 Dominance Relations
Chwe introduces a new dominance relation in a seminal paper [4].
3Deﬁnition 1.1 (Chwe) Let a,b two outcomes in Z. We say that a is indirectly dominated by
b, or a   b, if there exists a sequence of outcomes a = a0,a 1,...,am = b and a sequence of
coalitions S0,S 1, ...,Sm 1 such that ai  Si ai+1 and ai  Si b for i =0 ,1,2,...,m   1.
In such way, an outcome b is said to dominate indirectly another outcome a if b can replace a in
a sequence of moves such that at each move the active coalition Si prefers b to the alternative
outcome ai it faces at that stage. The indirect dominance captures the idea that coalitions can
anticipate other coalitions’ actions. Recently, some alternative deﬁnitions of dominance relations
and stable sets in e ectiveness coalitional games have been proposed in [5]. We recall some
central deﬁnitions on dominance relations in [5].
Deﬁnition 1.2 (path-believable farsighted dominance) Given a,b  Z, we say that a is
path-believable dominated by b if and only if there exists a chain of coalitions S0,S 1 ...Sm 1 and
a chain of outcomes a0,a 1 ...am such that a = a0  S0 a1  S1 a2 ......am 1  Sm 1 am = b
and  
   = Bh   Ph+1 h =0...m   1, or
 h  {0,...,m   1} : Bh =   Bh 1   Pk k = h...m
(1.1)
where
B0 = {c   Z | b   c}
Bh = {c   Z | k   c  k   Bh 1} h =1...m   1 (1.2)
Ph = {a   Z | Vi(a) > Vi(am h)  i   Sm h} h =1...m. (1.3)
We denote it by a  pbf b.
Deﬁnition 1.3 (weak path-believable farsighted dominance) In the same settings of Def-
inition 1.2, we say that a is weakly path-believable dominated by b if (1.1) is replaced by
 
Bh   Ph+1  =   h =0...m   1, or
 h  {0,...,m   1} : Bh =   Bh 1   Pk  =   k = h...m.
We denote it by a  wpbf b.
Deﬁnition 1.4 (weak  path-believable farsighted dominance) In the same settings of Def-
inition 1.2, we say that a is weakly* path-believable dominated by b if (1.1) is replaced by
 
Bh   Ph+1  =   h =0...m   1, or
 h  {0,...,m   1} : Bh =   Bh 1   Pk  =   k = h...m
and (1.2) by
Bh = {c   Z | k   c  k   Bh 1   Ph} h =1...m   1.
We denote it by a  w pbf b.
Deﬁnition 1.5 (Large path-believable farsighted dominance) In the same settings of Def-
inition 1.2, we say that a is strictly path-believable dominated by b if (1.3) is replaced by
Ph = {a   Z | Vi(a)  Vi(am h)  i   Sm h,  j   Sm h Vj(a) > Vj(am h)} h =1...m.
We denote it by a  lpbf b.
4Deﬁnition 1.6 (Large weak path-believable farsighted dominance) In the same settings
of Deﬁnition 1.2, we say that a is large weakly path-believable dominated by b if (1.1) is replaced
by  
Bh   Ph+1  =   h =0...m   1, or
 h  {0,...,m   1} : Bh =   Bh 1   Pk  =   k = h...m
and (1.3) by
Ph = {a   Z | Vi(a)  Vi(am h)  i   Sm h,  j   Sm h Vj(a) > Vj(am h)},h =1...m.
We denote it by a  lwpbf b.
Deﬁnition 1.7 (Large weak  path-believable farsighted dominance) In the same settings
of Deﬁnition 1.2, we say that a is large weakly  path-believable dominated by b if (1.1) is replaced
by  
Bh   Ph+1  =   h =0...m   1, or
 h  {0,...,m   1} : Bh =   Bh 1   Pk  =   k = h...m
and (1.2) by
Bh = {c   Z | k   c  k   Bh 1   Ph} h =1...m   1
and (1.3) by
Ph = {a   Z | Vi(a)  Vi(am h)  i   Sm h,  j   Sm h Vj(a) > Vj(am h)} h =1...m.
We denote it by a  lw pbf b.
For any a,e  Z such that a is dominated by e according to the previous deﬁnitions, the set of
outcomes in Bm 1 is denoted by Ba,e.
1.3 Stability solution concepts
We recall some deﬁnitions about stability solution concepts on coalitional games in e ectiveness
form.
Deﬁnition 1.8 ( -Stable Sets) A subset Y  Z is (weak, weak , large, large weak, large
weak ) path-believable farsightedly  -stable if
• for any a   Y  S,d we have that  e such that d  pbf e   Y (d  wpbf e   Y ; d  w pbf
e   Y ; d  lpbf e   Y ; d  lwpbf e   Y ; d  lw pbf e   Y )





• if no outcome e   Y such that d  pbf e (d  wpbf e   Y ; d  w pbf e   Y ; d  lpbf e   Y ;
d  lwpbf e   Y ; d  lw pbf e   Y ) exists and d   Y , then   i   S : Vi(a)  Vi(d);
• no outcome e   Y such that d  pbf e (d  wpbf e   Y ; d  w pbf e   Y ; d  lpbf e   Y ;
d  lwpbf e   Y ; d  lw pbf e   Y ) exists and d    Y .
The subset Fd,e is the collection of any Bm 1 with m the minimum length of any chain through
which d  pbf e (d  wpbf e   Y ; d  w pbf e   Y ; d  lpbf e   Y ; d  lwpbf e   Y ;
d  lw pbf e   Y ); each Bm 1 is the last subset of any minimal length chains starting from
e as described in Deﬁnitions in Subsection 1.2.
5Deﬁnition 1.9 (Sets of ﬁnal outcomes) Given any d,e  Z with e dominating d, Fd,e is
named the set of ﬁnal outcomes; otherwise, if e does not dominate d, Fd,e =  .
We give a particular class of stable sets.
Deﬁnition 1.10 (Main  -Stable Sets) A subset Y  Z for any d,e  Z is a main (weak,
weak , large, large weak, large weak ) path-believable farsightedly  -stable set if and only if
• Y is a (weak, weak , large, large weak, large weak ) path-believable farsightedly  -stable set;
• any Y
 
 Z such that Y   Y
 
is not a (weak, weak , large, large weak, large weak )
path-believable farsightedly  -stable set.
1.4 An overview on the algorithmic problem
We want to provide an algorithm for computing main (pbf, weak pbf, weak  pbf, large pbf, large
weak pbf, large weak  pbf )  -stable sets. In addition, we want to discuss some computational
aspects related to this solution in coalitional game theory for capturing bounded rationality as an
important feature of this solution. In fact, the (time) computational complexity of the problems
associated with it should not be too great since solution concepts are proposed as the basis for
economic decisions [6].
In our work a game is modeled through a non-empty directed pseudograph1 D =( Z,E) [2]
(which we’ll simply denote as digraph) whose nodes zi are the outcomes and edges ei are the
e ectiveness relation’s elements. We give some useful deﬁnitions for a clear reading.
Deﬁnition 1.11 (Walk, Trail, Path, k Cycle, Loop, Cycle) A walk is a non-empty al-
ternating sequence z0e0z1e1 ...ek 1zk of nodes zi and edges ei such that for all 0   i<k
ei =( zi,z i+1); its length is k. A trail z0e0z1e1 ...ek 1zk is a walk such that 0   i,j < k,
i  = j   ei  = ej. A path z0e0z1e1 ...ek 1zk is a trail such that 0   i,j < k, i  = j   zi  = zj.
A k cycle is a walk z0e0z1e1 ...zk 1ek 1zk such that z0e0z1e1 ...zk 1 is a path, z0 = zk and
whose lenght is k   2. A loop is an edge e =( zi,z i+1) where zi = zi+1. A cycle is a k cycle or
a loop; it is of length k if a k cycle, or 1 if a loop.
Roughly speaking, in a trail no edge can be repeated. Note that 0   i,j < k, i  = j implies
zi = zj can be true in a trail.
Deﬁnition 1.12 (e-Path) An e-path (extended path) z0e0z1e1 ...ek 1zk is a trail such that for
all 0   i < j   k if zi = zj then j = k. An e-path can be shortly denoted by its edge sequence
e0e1 ...ek 1.
Note that a path or cycle is an e-path, and an e-path can include a cycle. In addition, a sub
e-path is obviously an e-path.
Deﬁnition 1.13 (Deviation) We denote by  z the set of all the outgoing edges e  E whose
initial node is z. Its elements are called deviations from z.
Deﬁnition 1.14 (Sink) A sink is a node z for which  z =  .
Chwe, in [4], proposed a computer program (written in Mathematica) for computing the
largest consistent set. Being dominance   irriﬂexive, he does not deal with cycles2, while our
1In which nodes can be linked through multiple edges and loops are admitted.
2In the wide above deﬁned sense of loop or k-cycle.
6dominances requires us to consider them. In addition, every e-path joining two di erent outcomes
zi,z j and including cycles contains a (sub)path already joining the same outcomes. Let P a path
and C a cycle such that the e-path PC has initial node zi and terminal node zj. If zi is indirectly
dominated by zj along PC, then this is obviously true also along P, whereas it does not hold
with respect to our dominances.
Therefore, Chwe correctly disregards cycles and e-paths strictly including cycles (considering
only paths in the proper sense), while it is necessary to take account of them in our dominances.
Moreover, he exploits some internal properties and powerful routines available in Mathematica
without giving a precise algorithm. A slight extension of our algorithm permits us to compute
the largest consistent set easily.
In our algorithm the hard part is to discover all e-paths linking outcome pairs: this is done
with a constructive approach, exploring existing deviations from nodes until a sink or a cycle.
In general, a directed pseudograph representing an e ectiveness coalitional game is not a tree,
so it has been necessary to make use of a slightly modiﬁed stack data structure for “discovering”
any bifurcation starting from a node. Grafe et al. construct in [9] an algorithm which provides
the stable coalition structures of tree-graph communication games [1, 14, 18], and a particular
allocation of the core, the so called restricted marginal contribution allocation (RMCA). In tree-
graph communication games, players are located at the nodes of an undirected graph. An
undirected graph is a tree if each pair of di erent nodes is connected by exactly one path.
In [11], a similar tree-graph model is presented for studying stable coalition structures with
public goods. Kung presents a well deﬁned algorithmic solution that selects envy-free allocations
from the core. In [8], Goradia and others use a greedy distributed algorithm (PACT) that
facilitates selﬁsh rational agents to form coalitions in order to handle tasks. It is based on equal
excess theory for coalition formation which is a prescriptive bargaining solution concept to realize
stable solutions for any characteristic function.
More deep look is presented on [20] about the computational aspects of constructing the core
in the setting of qualitative coalitional games (QCGS). These kind of games are natural tools for
studying goal-oriented multi agent systems. In [7], Monge algorithm is developed for computing
the core of a convex, monotone cooperative game deﬁned on a weakly submodular lattice.
In Section 2, some initial input and output data structures are presented. In Section 3, the
algorithm and useful intermediate data structures are presented. In Section 4, some examples
to coalitional games are presented in order to outline some positive aspect of our algorithm. In
Section 5, some conclusions and further research trends are discussed.
2 Data structures
Let
• Pzi the set of all e-paths with initial node zi;
• Pzi,zk the set of all e-paths with initial node zi and terminal node zk.
The algorithmic implementation of the game is characterized by the global constants:
• n (the number of players of the game);
•N(the set of players);
• m (the number of outcomes = graph order ||D||);
and the following parameters, derived from above:
7• MP =
 m 1
j=0 (2n   1)
j+1 (j + 1)
 j
k=1(m   k): the maximum of |Pzi| over zi is upper-
bounded by MP;
• ML = m: the number of e ectiveness relation’s elements (edges) in the longest e-path;






: the upper bound on the total number of main  -stable sets found.
The data structures representing graph components are subsequently described, grouped within
their main “input”, “internal” and “output” computing environments. These data structures
are modeled after the aforementioned constants and parameters.
The following concepts are used throughout the subsequent discussion, and are related to
abstract (data types) and memory “objects” (variables) implementing the computational infras-
tructure of the algorithm.
Basic data types. There are three fundamental data types used to deﬁne various objects3:
integer stands for Z, real stands for R, and boolean stands for the logical values true or
false. The notation a..b indicates a range of all integer values from a to b both included,
ascending (if a   b) or descending (if a   b).
Abstract data types. Data structure types are deﬁned by the conventional notation: type
<abstract data type> = <type deﬁnition>, where <type deﬁnition> is the “algebra” deﬁning
the allowed values and operations for <abstract data type>. It can be basic (see previous) or
structured, and in this case it can be an array (numbered sequence of identical elements) or
record (a whatever collection of data structures). For example: type tCoalition = array[1..n]
of 0..1 deﬁnes an abstract data type named tCoalition as a vector (array) of n bits, and type
tComplexNumber = record RealPart: real; ImaginaryPartCoe : real; end deﬁnes a data structure
for storing complex numbers.
Variables. The memory objects implementing the basic or abstract data types are named “vari-
ables”, and are introduced by the notation var <variable name>: <abstract or basic data type>.
For example, using the previous type deﬁnitions we can declare a basic data type variable
var I: integer or the structured variables var V: tCoalition (whose i th element can be referred
to by V[i]) and var C: tComplexNumber.
Dynamic memory allocation. The deﬁnition type <dynamic-array-type> = array[] of <array-
base-type> introduces an abstract dynamic array4 which can be used to deﬁne an auto-
growing array variable5 in the following manner: var <array-variable>: <dynamic-array-type>.
The i th element of the dynamic array can be referred to by the notation <array-variable>[i].
For example, the deﬁnition type tCoalitions = array[] of tCoalition denotes an abstract data
type tCoalitions as an array (of unknown length) whose elements are of base type tCoalition;
it, in turn, can be used to deﬁne the variable var Coalitions: tCoalitions.
Hierarchical structures. Hierarchical structures concern data structures deﬁned inside other
data structures. The “dotted” notation <object1>.<object2> shows the hierarchical inclu-
sion of <object2> inside <object1>. For example, once declared var C: tComplexNumber we
refer to the real coe cient of the imaginary part of C by C.ImaginaryPartCoe .
3The term object stands for an abstract data type or a variable.
4Whose length is a-priori unknown.
5In the sense that every time a new element is added, array dimension automatically grows.
82.1 Input data structures
Our algorithm is based upon the following input data:
•Z : the set of the m outcomes (graph nodes) of the game;
• V   Rm n: the m real-valued payo s’ vectors, one for each outcome;
•     Rn: the vector of safety/risk values, one for each player;
• E   Z   Z   P(N) \ { }: the set of all graph edges, i.e. the e ectiveness relation of the
game.
2.1.1 Outcomes
The ﬁrst graph’s data structure Z is implemented as an array of length m
var Z: array[1..m] of tOutcome
and describes the coalition structures of the game. Each component zi (a coalition structure,
i =1 ..m) is of type tOutcome, deﬁned as follows:
type tOutcome = record
C: tCoalitions //the outcome’s coalitions of players
r: 0..|E| //the index of the ﬁrst edge (in E) starting from zi
end
The structure tCoalitions is so deﬁned as an array of unkonwn length whose components are
coalitions:
type tCoalitions = array[] of tCoalition
A single coalition is implemented as an array of bits of length n, where there is a 1 for each
player present in the coalition and 0 otherwise:
type tCoalition = array[1..n] of 0..1
2.1.2 Payo s
Game payo s V are represented by an m n array (one row for each outcome) which components
are the real-value payo s, one for each player:
var V: array[1..m,1..n] of real
92.1.3 Safety/risk vector
The safety/risk values  j are convex coe cients measuring the safety/risk degree of any player
participating in a move of a coalition. They are implemented by a real-valued array of length n:
var  : array[1..n] of real
2.1.4 E ectiveness relation
Let
type tEdge = record
s, d: 1..m //head and tail node of the edge
C: tCoalition //the “labeling” coalition associated to edge eC
s,d
end
be the abstract data type representing a graph edge. The e ectiveness relation E of the game is
implemented through a variable-length array (whose dimension |E| depends on the game’s rules):
var E: array[] of tEdge
storing the numbered sequence of the graph edges, whose components E[1..|E|]   eC
s,d are of type
tEdge and are sorted on “source” s and then on “destination” d nodes’ indexes (see section 4 for
applications).
2.2 Output data structures
2.2.1 Main  -stable sets
Le the following data type describe a set of outcomes:
type tSetOfOutcomes = {1,2,...,m}
Let
type tMainStableSets = array[] of tSetOfOutcomes
the data type representing the main  -stable sets found6, and the six path-believable farsighted
dominance relations (deﬁned in Deﬁnitions 1.2 through 1.7) be enumerated as follows:
type tBModes = {pbf, wpbf, w
 pbf, lpbf, lwpbf, lw
 pbf }
From this, we now introduce a data structure storing, for each of the six modalities, all main
 -stable sets found in the ﬁnal part of the algorithm:
6Whose (variable) dimension is upper bounded by MS.
10var S: array[tBModes] of tMainStableSets
2.3 Internal data structures
The algorithm is implemented through various internal data structures derived from the input
data and aimed at computing the output main  -stable sets. We subsequently describe the
fundamental internal data structures used inside our algorithm, mainly those representing the
e-paths in the directed pseudograph of the game and the matrices implementing both the indirect
and our dominance relations.
2.3.1 e-Paths in the directed pseudograph
The edges that make a single e-path (linking an initial to a terminal node) are deﬁned by the
following abstract data type representing a variable-length array of (integer) edge indexes:
type tPathEdges = array[] of 1..|E|
whose size is upper bounded by ML. From this, an e-path can be deﬁned as:
type tPath = record
l: 1..ML //e-path length, i.e. number of e-path edges
PR: tPathEdges //the variable-length array containing e-path edges’ indexes
h l: boolean //true if the e-path is or includes a cycle
end
All e-paths with initial node zi are represented by the auto-growing array:
type tNodePaths = array[] of tPath
whose dimension, over all nodes, is upper bounded by MP. The connectivity matrix storing, for
each pair (zi,z j) of outcomes, all e-paths from initial node zi to terminal node zj is implemented
by:




where CM[i,j].n p is the number of e-paths from zi to zj and the variable-length array CM[i,j].P
contains the e-paths linking zi to zj (represented as a sequence of edge indexes, see 2.1.4). This
data structure is an extension of the classical adjacency list representation A =[ aij] of a digraph,
in which aij counts the number of edges from zi to zj.
A key data structure (a “modiﬁed stack”, managed in a LIFO algorithmic manner [10]) used
in the exploration of all e-paths from an initial node is the following:
11var W: record
t: 0..MW
R: array[1..MW] of  |E|..|E|
end
where W.t is the actual dimension of the stack (zero if the stack is empty), and W.R is an array (of
maximum dimension MW) containing the edges’ indexes explored and/or to be processed. Its elements
are positive if they represent “active” edges (i.e. still to be processed), and negative if they denotes
already processed edges.
2.3.2 Dominance relations
In order to produce all main  -stable sets, in our algorithm we ﬁrst need to ﬁnd all indirect dominances,
stored in the data structure:
var IDM: array[1..m,1..m] of boolean
whose generic element IDM[i,j] is true if outcome zi dominates outcome zj indirectly, false oth-
erwise.
The path-believable farsighted dominance relations are stored in six matrices (one for each
{pbf, wpbf, w pbf, lpbf, lwpbf, lw pbf } mode7), containing the corresponding relations between
outcomes:
var BDM: array[tBModes] of tBDM
Each matrix is deﬁned as:
type tBDM = array[1..m,1..m] of record
n p: 0..MP
FO: tSetOfOutcomes





where, for each mode b
BDM[b][i,j].n p = CM[i,j].n p represents the number of e-paths between nodes zi and zj;
BDM[b][i,j].FO is the set of ﬁnal outcomes (see Deﬁnition 1.9);
BDM[b][i,j].A is a dynamic array, in which
• the k-th element BDM[b][i,j].A[k] corresponds to the k-th e-path CM[i,j].P[k] in the
connectivity matrix,
7see 2.2.1.
12• BDM[b][i,j].A[k].i d is true if zj dominates zi along the k-th e-path according to the
corresponding criterion, and
• BDM[b][i,j].A[k].Y is Bzi,zj, the backward induction set of outcomes along the k-th
e-path (see sections 1.2 through 1.7).
3 The algorithm
The algorithm proceeds starting from the “construction” of the connectivity matrix CM, then
the indirect dominance matrices are built; ﬁnally, all main  -stable sets are generated, one for
each mode. The sequence of the main steps of the algorithm is described as follows:
1. build the connectivity matrix CM;
2. build the indirect dominance relation matrix IDM;
3. for each mode b   tBModes build BDM[b];
4. for each mode b   tBModes compute S[b].
Each step is subsequently detailed in its internal articulation.
Step 1.
foreach o in 1..m do
1.1 <ﬁnd and store all e-paths with initial node zo>
1.2 <ﬁnd and store all e-paths between nodes (zo,z i),i=1 ..m >
endfor o
Step 1.1.
In this step all e-paths starting from current node zo are explored and stored in the variable X,
i.e. Pzo.
Internal variables. The variables used internally in this step are deﬁned as follows:
var
X: record
n p: 0..MP //number of e-paths with initial node zo




c s: boolean //true when the current e-path is stored in Cnp
l: 0..ML //length (number of edges) of the current e-path
r: 0..|E| //current edge index to consider in array E
c r: 0..|E| //array E current row’s head
w a: 0..MW //number of active edges in W.R
13Initial settings. All variables to be processed are set to their initial values. If current node zo
is a sink (r=0) there is no further processing to do for this step, otherwise array E is scanned
(starting from index r and until all edges with initial node zo have been examined8) to ﬁnd and
store in the stack9 (for subsequent processing) all deviations in  zo:
r   Z[o].r; X.n p   0; W.t   0; l   0
c s   false;cr   o;wa   0
if r=0 then exit //step 1.1
StoreActiveEdgesIntoStack(c r)
Process active edges. All deviations in  zo and still to be processed (shortly termed “active”
edges) are followed, and all possible e-paths deriving from them (until a sink or a cycle is detected)
are found and stored.
while w a > 0 do
if r>0 then
ProcessStackTopElement
if CycleDetected then //there is a cycle
r   0
else
r   Z[E[Cpe[l]].d].r
endif
endif
If a sink has been reached or a cycle has been detected, store the current e-path and prepare for
the next one. This is done by removing the processed top elements (edges) from the working stack
until the ﬁrst non-processed one, and then copying all processed elements from the bottom to
the top of the stack into the new e-path (this is done because of the common nature of the edges
composing the sub e-path already processed, which will be completed through the subsequent




foreach i in 1..W.t do
if W.R[i]<0 then
l   l+1; c s   false;C pe[l]   -W.R[i]
endif
endfor i
If there are still active edges in the working stack, go on processing:
if w a>0 then
ProcessStackTopElement
if CycleDetected then
r   0
8This can be done because the array E is sorted by ascending values of edge heads E[r].s.
9See page 12 for its formal deﬁnition.
14else
r   Z[E[Cpe[l]].d].r
if r>0 then
c r   E[r].s
else




If the terminal node of the edge just inserted in the current e-path is not a sink, prepare for the
next edge processing and main loop iteration:
else //r>0
c r   E[r].s
endif
if r>0 then StoreActiveEdgesIntoStack(c r)
endwhile
After all active edges have been processed (i.e. working stack is empty) and all e-paths from
node zo have been found, transfer them to the data structure X:
if not c s then StoreCurrentPath
X.P   Cnp
Routine StoreActiveEdgesIntoStack is here detailed:
routine StoreActiveEdgesIntoStack(input z: 1..m)
begin
foreach i in r..|E| do
if E[i].s = z then
//edge ei is “active”: push its index into stack
w a   w a + 1
W.t   W.t+1; W.R[W.t]   i
endif
else




Routine StoreCurrentPath copies the current e-path to the temporary data structure Cnp:
routine StoreCurrentPath
begin
15X.n p   X.n p+1
Cnp[X.n p].l   l
Cnp[X.n p].P   Cpe
Cnp[X.n p].h l   CycleDetected
l   0 //reset the length for the new e-path to be built
c s   true
end
The above mentioned routine ProcessStackTopElement (detailed as follows) removes the top ele-
ment (edge) from the stack (unless a loop has been detected, in which case processing is deferred
to the next e-path) by copying it to the current e-path (a processed edge is indicated by a negative
value). Finally, the number of active edges present in the working stack is decremented:
routine ProcessStackTopElement
begin
if CycleDetected then exit(ProcessStackTopElement)
l   l+1
c s   false
Cpe[l]   W.R[W.t]
W.R[W.t]   -W.R[W.t]
w a   w a-1
end
Step 1.2.
In the second sub-step, e-paths linking node zo to other nodes zd are found and stored in the
connectivity matrix element CM[o,d], i.e. Pzo,zd.
Initialize e-paths. The number of e-paths with initial node zo are set to zero, and processing for
the current node terminates if zo is a sink:
foreach s in 1..m do CM[o,s].n p   0
if X.n p = 0 then exit loop o
Build the current row of the connectivity matrix. This is done by determining all existing e-paths
between current node zo and all nodes in the following manner. For each e-path p with initial
node zo its edges are scanned descendingly with respect to the index r, storing in the matrix
element CM[o,d] all distinct (sub)e-paths of length r linking zo to the tail d of the r th edge:
foreach p in 1..X.n p do
foreach r in X.P[p].L..1 do
d   E[X.P[p].PR[r]].d
if not SubpathAlreadyStored then
CM[o,d].n p   CM[o,d].n p + 1
CM[o,d].P[CM[o,d].n p].l   r
foreach s in 1..r do






In this step e-paths linking each node pair (zo1,z o2) and already in CM are explored, and all
indirect dominances found are stored in the matrix IDM. The following internal variables are
used:
var
CP: tPath //current e-path under processing
s: 1..m //the head of each edge of the current e-path
The main loop is executed on all node pairs (zo1,z o2) and the indirect dominances found are
stored in the matrix IDM, whose elements on the main diagonal are obviously already set to
false:
foreach o1 in 1..m do
foreach o2 in 1..m do
if IDM[o1,o 2] is not empty then next loop o2 //element already set
foreach p in 1..CM[o1,o 2].n p do
CP   CM[o1,o 2].P[p]
if IndirectDominanceAlong(CP) then
foreach i in 1..CP.l do
//all current e-path edges’ heads are dominated by current terminal node zo2
s   E[CP.PR[i]].s





if IDM[o1,o 2] is empty then
//we deﬁnitely know there cannot be a dominance




Function IndirectDominanceAlong(p) tests if there is an indirect dominance along the current e-path
p between its ﬁrst and last nodes, i.e. if for each intermediate edge’s head zo all intermediate
coalitions’ payo s in terminal node zo2 are strictly greater than those in zo:
function IndirectDominanceAlong(input P: tPath): boolean
begin
foreach r in 1..P.l do //explore all e-path edges






The test is made through the function AllPayo sAreBetter:
function AllPayo sAreBetter(input strictly: boolean; in e1 :1 ..|E|; in o2 :1 ..m): boolean
var o1: 1..m //the intermediate node to check
begin
o1   E[e1].s //the ﬁrst node whose payo s are to be checked against last node o2
foreach i in 1..n do
if E[e1].C[i] = 1 then //the player i is in the coalition labeling edge e1
if (strictly and V[o1,i] V[o2,i]) or (not strictly and V[o1,i]>V[o2,i]) then




if strictly then return(true)
//Now we are in the large (non strictly) case, so the test goes on.
//All payo s are  ; we now test if that at least one is >:
foreach i in 1..n do
if E[e1].C[i] = 1 then //player i is in the coalition labeling edge e1
if V[o1,i]<V[o2,i] then








The generation of our dominance matrices is executed for each mode and according to their
corresponding criteria:
foreach b in tBModes do Build BDM(b)
Routine Build BDM is detailed here, together with its internal data structures; for each b it ﬁnds
all e-paths (already stored in CM) between outcomes along which there is a dominance, and ﬂags
their indexes in the corresponding BDM[b] matrix.
routine Build BDM(input b: tBModes)
var
i d: boolean //true if there is a dominance between outcomes (o1,o 2)
Bi, B: tSetOfOutcomes //the backward induction (BI) sets
B
 : tSetOfOutcomes //the BI set used in w pbf and lw pbf
18strictly: boolean //true if payo s are to be tested strictly
begin
//Set the appropriate payo  check criterion
strictly   false
if b  {pbf, wpbf, w
 pbf } then strictly   true
foreach o1 in 1..m do
foreach o2 in 1..m do
//All e-paths connecting (o1,o 2) may potentially generate a dominance
BDM[b][o1,o 2].n p   CM[o1,o 2].n p
if BDM[b][o1,o 2].n p = 0 then
next loop o2 //there is nothing to do for the current “dominant” node
endif
BuildInitialBISet //build the ﬁrst-level set of all backward inductions
foreach p in 1..CM[o1,o 2].n p do
i d   true //initially we hypothesize there is a dominance...
B   Bi //...and start again with the initial BI set
foreach r in CM[o1,o 2].P[p].l..1 do //reverse loop on all e-path edges
//Correctly set the variables for the subsequent dominance test
InitializeDominance
//Manage the di erent stop criteria for the various modes
if b  {pbf, lpbf } then
ManageStdModes
elseif b  {wpbf, lwpbf } then
ManageWeakModes
elseif b  {w
 pbf, lw




if not i d then exit loop r
//Because there is still a potential dominance, we now re-build the BI set and repeat the payo 
//check for the previous edge in the e-path (unless the ﬁrst edge has already been examined):
if r>1 then RebuildBISet
endfor r





The dominance tests carried out by Build BDM are implemented through a series of internal
routines, which are detailed as follows.
routine InitializeDominance
begin
if b  {wpbf, w
 pbf, lwpbf, lw
 pbf } then
//in this modes a slightly di erent logic applies for the stop criterion
i d   false
if b  {w
 pbf, lw
 pbf } then
B






//There is a dominance only if all payo s are better for all e-path edges
foreach o   B do //explore the outcomes in the current BI Set
if not AllPayo sAreBetter(strictly, CM[o1,o 2].P[p].PR[r], o) then
i d   false //no dominance along the current e-path







//There is a dominance only if all payo s are better for all e-path edges, but only for at least one BI set element
foreach o   B do //explore the outcomes in the current BI set
if AllPayo sAreBetter(strictly, CM[o1,o 2].P[p].PR[r], o) then








//There is a dominance only if all payo s are better for all e-path edges
foreach o   B do //explore the outcomes in the current BI set
if AllPayo sAreBetter(strictly, CM[o1,o 2].P[p].PR[r], o) then
i d   true //at least one dominance has been found
B
    B






BDM[b][o1,o 2].A[p].i d   i d
if (b  {pbf, lpbf }) or (b  {wpbf, lwpbf } and i d) then
BDM[b][o1,o 2].A[p].Y   B
elseif (b  {w
 pbf, lw
 pbf }) and i d then
BDM[b][o1,o 2].A[p].Y   B
 
elseif (b  {wpbf, lwpbf, w
 pbf, lw
 pbf }) and not i d then





Bi   //start with an empty set,
//and add all outcomes indirectly dominating terminal node o2
foreach c in 1..m do
if IDM[o2,c]=true then Bi   Bi  {c}
endfor c
//If the BI set is empty, it must initially contain the terminal node




Bn: tSetOfOutcomes //the new BISet built from the current one
Bt: tSetOfOutcomes //the set whose outcomes are to be considered
begin
if b  {w
 pbf, lw
 pbf } then
Bt   B
 
else
Bt   B
endif
Bn   //start with an empty set
foreach o   Bt do
//Add the outcomes that indirectly dominate all nodes in the current BISet
foreach c in 1..m do
if IDM[o,c]=true then Bn   Bn  {c}
endfor c
endfor o
if Bn =   then Bn   Bt
B   Bn
end
Step 4.
A main (pbf, wpbf, w pbf, lpbf, lwpbf, lw pbf )  -stable set10 S is built as follows.
• Step 4.1. If Z is stable, return S; else, go to step 4.2.
• Step 4.2. Collect all the outcomes not stable in Z in a subset D. We can say that Z\D is
a stable set. Take z   D. Check if (Z\D) {z} is stable. If it is not, remove z; otherwise,
add z to ¯ D   D. Repeat this procedure for all elements in D. Finally, we have a subset
¯ D   D. If ¯ D =   then return S = Z\D; else, go to step 4.3.
• Step 4.3. Let z   ¯ D  =  . Take any element Az   P( ¯ D) \{ z} such that z   Az. Consider
all the subsets Az such that (Z\D)   Az is stable. This family Az is totally ordered
with respect to inclusion relation; so, take the maximal element ¯ Az. Repeat this for all
z   ¯ D. Therefore, some subsets ¯ Az   ¯ D for which z   ¯ Az are associated to any element
z   ¯ D. Select all the maximal H   P( ¯ D) such that x    z H   ¯ Az x   H. Finally, return
S =( Z\D)   H.
10In the following three sub steps, we use the term stable as (pbf, wpbf, w pbf, lpbf, lwpbf, lw pbf )  -stable.
21From what above said, we now detail the algorithmic implementation of the main  -stable
sets construction as follows.
foreach b   tBModes do
//Compute the main stable sets, one for each mode
Build Main Stable Set(b)
endfor b
Routine Build Main Stable Set, repeated for each mode, is subsequently detailed.
routine Build Main Stable Set(input b: tBModes)
type
//A single subset (part) of the power set used during main stable set generation
tPart = record
A: tSetOfOutcomes //the part itself
i s: boolean //true if the part has passed the stability test
end
//The entire power set
tPowerSet = array[0..2
m   1] of tPart
var
S0,S n: tSetOfOutcomes //the stable sets computed at the ﬁrst and subsequent iterations
D: tSetOfOutcomes //the set of potentially “bad” outcomes
¯ D: tSetOfOutcomes //the set of “good” outcomes
nS: 1..MS //counts how many main stable sets are generated
Az: tPowerSet //array of all subsets (parts) generated during main stable sets’ construction
begin
nS   0 //there are still no main stable sets found
ComputeInitialStableSet
IsolateBadOutcomes //isolate “bad” (i.e. not in the initial stable set) outcomes
//Search for all next possible stable sets
FirstStabilityTest
FinalStabilityTests
//If no main stable set has been found, we assume an empty stable set
if nS =0then S[b][1]   
end
The internal operations of Build Main Stable Set are implemented through the following routines.
routine ComputeInitialStableSet
begin
S0   Build Stable Set(b, Z, Z)
D   Z \ S0
if D=  then
//S0=Z is a main stable set
nS   nS +1
S[b][nS]   Z





¯ D   
foreach z   D do
Sn   Build Stable Set(b, {z},S 0  {z})
if Sn = {z} then
¯ D   ¯ D  {z} //outcome z has passed the stability test
endif
endfor z
if ¯ D=  then
//no outcome augmentes S0, so it is a main stable set
nS   nS +1
S[b][nS]   S0
exit(Build Main Stable Set) //nothing else to do for the current mode
endif
if |¯ D| =1then
nS   nS +1
S[b][nS]   S0   ¯ D





Sn   Build Stable Set(b, ¯ D, S0   ¯ D)
if Sn = ¯ D then //¯ D is stable
nS   nS +1
S[b][nS]   S0   ¯ D





//Generate the power set of ¯ D and sort its elements by descending cardinality
Az   ReverseSort(P(¯ D))
//Test all parts of ¯ D until those of cardinality 2
foreach k in 1..2
|¯ D|   2 do
if not IsStableIncluded(k) then
//Test the stability of the current part
Sn   Build Stable Set(b,A z[k].A, S0   Az[k].A)
if Sn =A z[k].A then //subset Az[k].A is stable
nS   nS +1
S[b][nS]   S0   Az[k].A





23Function IsStableIncluded(k) simply tests if the k th part of power set Az is included in an already
found and stored stable part. Function Build Stable Set is detailed as follows, together with its
internal routines.
function Build Stable Set(input Zs,Z r: tSetOfOutcomes): tSetOfOutcomes
//This function constructs the set of the stable outcomes from our dominances.
//Zs contains the outcomes whose stability has to be checked.
//Zr is the subset with respect Zs is stable to; it introduces consistency concept (see Deﬁnition 1.8).
var
A: tSetOfOutcomes //the ﬁnal computed result
r0: 1..|E| //ﬁrst deviation in  zo
d: 1..m //tail of deviation r
mP: 1..ML //the length of shortest e-path(s) on which there is a dominance
no d: boolean //true if no outcome dominates the terminal node
fail: boolean //true if the current outcome does not enter the stable set
begin
A   //the stable set is initially empty
foreach o   Zs do
r0   Z[o].r //this is the ﬁrst deviation for the current node
if r0 =0then
A   A  {o} //this is a sink, so it enters the stable set
next loop o
endif
foreach r in r0..|E| do
if not E[r].s = o then exit loop r //deviations are terminated
d   E[r].d
TestCurNodeInclusion
if fail then exit loop r
endfor r
//If the current outome has passed ALL checks, we add it to the stable set






no d   true //we hypothesize no outcome dominates d
foreach c   Zr do
if not Is Dominated(d,c) then next loop c //nothing to do
no d   false //there is at least one dominant node for d
if BDM[b][d,c].FO =   then Build FO
//Stability test for the current outcome zo
fail   false
if not StabilityTestOk(BDM[b][d,c].FO) then




24if not no d then exit(TestCurNodeInclusion)
//No dominance exists for terminal node d: test stability
if d   Zr then
fail   false
if not StabilityTestOk({d}) then fail   true
else





//First determine e-paths’ minimum length
mP   MAXINT //an high initial value; we will soon update it...
foreach p in BDM[b][d,c].n p do
if BDM[b][d,c].A[p].i d then
if CM[d,c].P[p].l < mP then




//Build the set of ﬁnal outcomes as the union of all the BI sets of e-paths of minimal length
foreach p in 1..BDM[b][d,c].n p do
if BDM[b][d,c].A[p].i d then
if CM[d,c].P[p].L = mP then
//add the current BI set to the ﬁnal outcomes’ set





function StabilityTestOk(input FO: tSetOfOutcomes): boolean
//True if the input FO set gives a stability with respect to the current outcome zo
var vmin,v max: real //min and max payo  values for the input FO set
begin
foreach i in 1..n do
if E[r].C[i]=1 then
//ﬁnd the minimum and maximum payo  values on the outcomes in the current
//FO set with respect to the current player i
vmin   FindMinPayo Value(V[FO,i])
vmax   FindMaxPayo Value(V[FO,i])
//compare the safety/risk level against the payo  value





254 Some applications to coalitional games
In this section, we introduce some results obtained through a GNU Extended Pascal imple-
mentation of our algorithm. Each example is presented for outlining how our algorithm has a
well-mannered behavior with respect to games modeled by di erent complex directed pseudo-
graphs. The computational time is really short for all examples below.
4.1 An example with parallel edges
We present a game which has three bifurcations from a node z1 to a node z2. From the last, two











6    z4
This example shows how our algorithm works well on computing all e-paths starting from node
z1 and ending with a sink by using the idea of “modiﬁed stack” deﬁned on page 12. Game’s
































Our algorithm selects all e-paths11 between z1 and z4:
Pz1,z4 = {1   5   6, 1   4   6, 2   5   6, 2   4   6, 3   5   6, 3   4   6}
So, our algorithm goes on computing dominance relations BDM[b], b   tPBFModes and the related
table of the set of ﬁnal outcomes as shown in Table 112:
(a) BDM[b][i,j].A[k].i d






i \ j z1 z2 z3 z4
z1   {z3} {z3}  
z2   {z3}    
z3        
z4        
Table 1
The unique main (.5,.5,.5)-stable set S[b][1] is {z3,z 4} for each mode b.
11Which are strictly paths.
12Where in the data structure BDM[b][i,j] element A[k].i d is true if zj dominates zi on at least one path k.
264.2 An example with multiple cycles and a sink
We present a game which has multiple 3-cycles, 2-cycles and no loop with a sink.
z1
1   
2
   z2
3
  












































Our algorithm captures all the e-paths which are or contain cycles as follows: 2 6, 1 4 6, 1 
3 6, 4 6 2, 4 6 1, 3 6 2, 3 6 1, 6 2, 6 1 4, 6 1 3 and paths ending in the unique
sink z4:2   7, 1   5, 1   4   7, 1   3   7, 5, 4   7, 3   7, 7, 6   2, 6   1   5.
It enables to ﬁnd out Pzi,zj for any i,j =1 ...m. Pzi,zj is represented at the (zi,z j) entry13
of Table 2 as a subset of e-paths. All the main (.5,.5,.5)-stable sets S[b][1] according to each
dominance mode b coincide with {z1,z 2,z 4}.
z1 z2 z3 z4
z1
2   6
1   4   6
1   3   6
1
2
1   4
1   3
2   7
1   5
1   4   7
1   3   7
z2
4   6
3   6
4   6   1
3   6   1
4
4   6   2
3
3   6   2
5
4   7
3   7
z3 6 6   1
6   2
6   1   4
6   1   3
7
6   1   5
z4
Table 2: Connectivity matrix CM
13In which column zj dominates row zi.
274.3 An example with no sink
This game is presented in [4] as an example for computation of the largest consistent set.
z1
1   
2
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All kinds of dominances and related set of ﬁnal outcomes are computed, whose results are pre-
sented in Tables 3, 4.
(a) BDM[pbf ][i,j].A[k].i d






i \ j z1 z2 z3 z4
z1        
z2        
z3       {z1,z 2}




i \ j z1 z2 z3 z4
z1     {z1,z 2,z 4} {z2,z 3}
z2     {z1,z 2,z 3} {z2,z 3}
z3     {z1,z 2,z 4} {z1,z 2}
z4 {z2}   {z3} {z3}
(b) BDM[{wpbf, w
 pbf }][i,j].A[k].i d




z4 true true true
(c) BDM[wpbf ][i,j].FO
i \ j z1 z2 z3 z4
z1     {z1,z 2,z 4} {z2,z 3}
z2     {z1,z 2,z 3,z 4} {z2,z 3}
z3     {z1,z 2,z 3,z 4} {z1,z 2}
z4 {z2}   {z1,z 2,z 3} {z1,z 2,z 3,z 4}
Table 4
28The initial  -stable set S0[pbf ] is {z2}. The main (0,0)-stable sets are14 S[pbf ][1]={z2,z 4} and
S[pbf ][2]={z2,z 3} while the main (0,0)-stable sets S[{wpbf, w
 pbf }][1] = S0[{wpbf, w
 pbf }] coincide
with {z1,z 2}.
4.4 An example on loops and saturation of MP
Let the following game:
z1 1   
2




























































Any possible edge eC
s,d is constructed according to any of the three possible choices of a
coalition C in P(N)\{ }. In fact, the maximum of |Pzi| over zi saturates completely the bound
MP at level 21 in our algorithm. All the main (.5,.5)-stable sets S[b] for each dominance mode b
coincide with empty sets.
5 Computational aspects and conclusions
In our work we chose to adopt the high-level programming language GNU Extended Pascal to
implement the algorithm because of its intrinsic data abstraction modeling power. Other more
powerful computing environments such as Mathematica, Maple, Matlab are not so well suited
in describing the very complex data structures needed to solve this class of problems, which
14With some ﬁxed order determined by the algorithm.
29are in practice at a “simple” computing level (whilst being in theory of overexponential order
complexity) but need highly complex data structures.
Wherever possible a “static” deﬁnition of some data structures has been made: this can be
done because of the existence of the upper bounds deﬁned in Section 2. In many other cases
auto-growing (“dynamic”) arrays have been used, as for the connectivity matrix CM to deﬁne
the unknown number of variable length e-paths composing each element CM[i,j].
Games can be easily constructed whose relatively low input size leads to impossibly large
computational requirements: in fact, the time complexity of our algorithm mainly depends on
the value MP (see section 2) whose order with respect to input parameters n and m is O(2nmm!).
Each possible value of a bound on MP is presented at varying of m,n in Table below. But the
good news is that a great many of the games that are of practical importance turn out to have
reasonably small values of involved parameters: “Prisoner’s Dilemma”, played in coalitional
contingent situation threats, has been tested with m = 4 outcomes, n = 2 players (MP = 2487)
and up to 32 e ectiveness relations in less than 1 second. Indeed, no application we carried out
required more than 1 sec. of computing time!
m \ n 1 2 3 4
2 3 21 105 465
3 11 201 2261 21165
4 49 2487 64099 1277115
5 261 37983 2260083 96108315
6 1631 691833 95388797 8669229765
7 11743 14650581 4690336945 911730231465
8 95901 353811531 263342876391 109539127328415
9 876809 9599060667 16624117578719 14801589642360615
10 8877691 289079403933 1165565147011153 2221895340717043065
Table 5: Values of MP
Our algorithm can be used (with slightly adaptations) to compute other concepts of stability
in e ectiveness coalitional games such as standard behaviour [21], the credible largest consistent
set [3], the largest cautious consistent set [12], the stability set [16], uncovered set [13].
We ﬁnally observe that the implementation of our algorithm is susceptible of being improved,
especially in the area of e-path exploration and construction of the connectivity matrix.
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